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MURRAY v. GIARRANTANO
109 S. Ct. 2765, 106 L. Ed. 2d 713 (1989)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS AND HOLDING
In a class action suit initiated by death row inmates, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that states were not constitutionally required to
appoint counsel to indigent death row inmates in state collateral
proceedings.
The Supreme Court overturned a Fourth Circuit opinion which
held that the legal assistance provided to death row inmates in
Virginia, who wish to pursue state habeas corpus appeals, did not
meet the Constitutional requirements of meaningful access to the
courts as set forth in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 1491,
52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977). Although Bounds itself only required states
to furnish access to adequate law libraries or other legal aid so that all
prisoners might prepare petitions for judicial relief, 430 U.S. at 828,
97 S. Ct. at 1498, the district court in Giarratanohad found that the
special "considerations" applicable to death row inmates entitled
these inmates to counsel if the access requirement of Bounds was to
be satisfied. These special considerations were that the inmates had a
limited amount of time to prepare their petitions, that their cases were
unusually complex, and that the shadow of impending execution
would interfere with their ability to do legal work. Giarratanov.
Murray, 847 F.2d 1118, 1120 (4th Cir. 1980). The Fourth Circuit,
determining that the district court's findings were not clearly
erroneous, affirmed the district court's holding that death row
inmates were entitled to the continuous assistance of counsel
throughout state collateral proceedings.
The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the district court's holding that
Pennsylvaniav. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990,95 L. Ed. 2d
539 (1987), which held that there was no constitutional right to
counsel in state collateral proceedings, was not dispositive in this
case. The reasoning for this determination was that Finley was not a
meaningful access case, but rather held that the Sixth Amendment's
right to counsel did not require a state to provide counsel in a
collateral proceeding. Further, Finley did not address the rule
enunciated in Bounds, and it did not involve a capital case. Giarratano v. Murray, 847 F.2d at 1122.
The Supreme Court rejected the holdings of the district court
and the Fourth Circuit which stated that capital cases require more
legal assistance at collateral proceedings than non-capital cases. The
Court first reiterated that states are not constitutionally obligated to
provide post-conviction relief. United States v. MacCollum, 426 U.S.
317, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 48 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1976). When relief is
provided, however, "the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due
Process Clause does not require that the state supply a lawyer as
well." Pennsylvaniav. Finley, 481 U.S. at 556-557, 107 S.Ct. at
1994-1995. Rather, the Court determined that the Finley holding of
no right to counsel at state collateral proceedings did indeed apply to
death row inmates.
The Court noted that a capital defendant receives special
procedures at trial to insure that all due process rights are protected.
Further, the additional safeguards imposed by the Eighth Amendment
at the trial stage of a capital case will assure "a greater degree of
reliability" in the process by which the death penalty is imposed.
Murray v. Giarratano,109 S.Ct. 2765, 2770 (1989); citing Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978).
Finally, the Court stated that the "direct appeal is the primary avenue
for review of a conviction of sentence, and death penalty cases are no
exception." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S. CL 3383,
3391, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1090, 1097 (1983). Since the rights of capital

defendants have been specially looked after at both the trial level and
direct appeal stages, the Court determined there was no need to
provide extra protection to death row inmates at the collateral stage
as well. Rather, the minimal protection afforded by Bounds, supra,
would suffice to meet the constitutional requirement of meaningful
access to the courts.
The Court also addressed the Fourth Circuit's argument that
there was a tension between the holdings in Bounds,supra,which
required that states provide prisoners meaningful access to the courts
and Finley, supra,which held that "meaningful access" did not "
require the State to appoint counsel for indigent prisoners seeking
postconviction relief. The Fourth Circuit had distinguished Finley,
holding that in light of Bounds, the Supreme Court in Finley could
not have been addressing death row inmates when it declared that
prisoners had no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in
state collateral proceedings. The Supreme Court rejected this
interpretation of Finley by stating that the right of meaningful access
to the courts at issue in Bounds rests on the constitutional theories of
due process and equal protection which were also considered in
Finley. Thus, the holdings of Bounds and Finley are to be used as
guidelines to the states for interpreting the type of access to the courts
the constitution guarantees. The Court stated further, that the
Constitutional doctrine of meaningful access must be applied
uniformly in every state. Allowing Bounds to overrule Finley based
on lower court findings of special "considerations" in a case would
permit a different constitutional rule to apply in different states if the
lower court judge hearing that claim reached different conclusions.
Therefore, the Court concluded that the rule of Pennsylvaniav.
Finley, should apply no differently in capital cases than in non-capital
cases.
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, conceded that
collateral relief proceedings were a central part of the review process
for prisoners sentenced to death. He further stated that the complexity of jurisprudence in the area of capital cases makes it unlikely that
capital defendants will be able to file successful petitions for
collateral relief without counsel. However, he explained that the
Supreme Court lacked the capacity to formulate appropriate rules for
meaningful access to the courts and would therefore have to leave
this task to the state legislatures. While stating that the procedures
adopted in Virginia for providing legal assistance to inmates were not
as far reaching and effective as those in other states, Justice Kennedy
noted that as of this opinion, no prisoner on death row had been
unable to obtain counsel for representation in a post-conviction
proceeding.
ANAYLSIS
In light of Justice Kennedy's concurrence and the fact that there
was only a 5-4 majority in this case, the standard for meaningful
access to the courts could change in the future. Should the state
legislature refuse to adopt improved measures for meaningful access
to the courts and ultimately cause a prisoner on death row to be
without effective assistance in a collateral proceeding, Justice
Kennedy could swing the vote in favor of requiring counsel to be
appointed to death row inmates in post-conviction proceedings. For
now, however, attorneys should be aware that there is a statutory
entitlement in Virginia which permits the appointment of counsel at
state habeas corpus proceedings. Va. Code Ann. §14.1-183 (1989).
The Attorney General's Office does not oppose these appointments,
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Murray v. Giarratano,109 S. Ct. at 2781, n. 25, and they are made if
aprose inmate can raise at least one non-frivolous claim in his/her
petition. However, petitions with a chance for ultimate success
usually claim ineffective assistance of counsel or denial of Brady

materials and these claims are difficult for apro se petitioner to assert
without necessary investigative services.
Summary and analysis by: Catherine M. Hobart

POWELL v. TEXAS
109 S. Ct. 3146,106 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1989)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
(The following facts were undisputed.)
On the day of petitioner's arrest, the trial court, at the State's
request ordered that a psychiatric examination be performed to
determine (1) petitioner's competency to stand trial and (2) his sanity
at the time of the offense. In all, petitioner was examined on six
occasions by two doctors. Neither petitioner nor his counsel was
notified that the examination would encompass the issue of future
dangerousness; nor was petitioner informed of his right to remain
silent. Finally, over petitioner's objection, both doctors testified at the
sentencing hearing, their opinion based on these examinations, that
petitioner "would commit future acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." 109 S. CL at 3148, quoting 742
S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en bane).
Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death. Petitioner sought review asserting that evidence received
during the penalty phase of his trial violated his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights. The United States Supreme Court, 108 S.Ct.
2891, vacated the Texas court's judgment and remanded for further
consideration in light of Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.
CL 1792, 100 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1988)(held, inter alia, that neither the
placement of the State's motions nor the court's ex parte orders for
psychiatric testimony satisfied the notice requirement to defense
counsel that such evaluation of defendant's future dangerousness
would occur). On remand, the Texas court reinstated its prior
decision. The Court, noting that this precise question was before the
Court for the second time, reversed the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals because that decision was inconsistent with its
decisions in Satterwhitev. Texas, supra,and Estelle v. Smith, 451
U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 68 L. Ed. 2d359 (1981).
HOLDING
The Supreme Court held that: (1) [the] defendant was deprived
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when psychiatric examinations were performed by state experts, without notice to defendant or
his attorney that the examinations would encompass [the] issue of
future dangerousness, and (2) defendant's introduction of psychiatric
testimony in support of defense of insanity did not waive his Sixth
Amendment right to notification. 109 S.Ct at 3146.
ANALYSIS
In Estelle v. Smith, supra, the Court held that a capital defendant's Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination
precludes the State from subjecting him to a psychiatric examination
concerning future dangerousness without first informing the
defendant that he has a right to remain silent and that anything he
says can be used against him. Powell, citing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 461469. In Estelle, the Court unanimously held that, once a capital
defendant is formally charged, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
precludes examination without notification that "the psychiatric

examination (will) encompass the issue of their client's future
dangerousness." Id. at 471.
Despite the close similarity between the facts of this case and
those in Estelle, the Court of Criminal Appeals alternatively held: (1)
that petitioner's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated,
742 S.W.2d at 357-359, and (2) even if they were, that the error was
harmless, id., at 359-360. After granting a writ of certiorari, the
Supreme Court vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the
case for further consideration in light of Satterwhite. The Court of
Criminal Appeals simply withdrew the portion which relied on
harmless-error analysis and retained the remaining holdings, over one
dissenting opinion. The court reasoned that petitioner not only
waived his right to object to the State's use of psychiatric testimony
to rebut his defense, but also waived his right to its use to satisfy the
State's burden of proving future dangerousness. Id. at 358-359.
Finding faulty Fifth and Sixth Amendment analysis and no support
for this conclusion, the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court
declined to address whether a waiver (by the defendant) of the right
to object to the use of psychiatric testimony at the guilt phase of a
capital trial extends to the sentencing phase as well.
Support for the lower court's decision on the waiver issue is
found primarily in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Battie v. Estelle, 655
F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1981). In that case, the Court of Appeals suggested
that if a defendant introduces psychiatric testimony to establish a
mental-status defense, the government may be justified in also using
such testimony to rebut the defense notwithstanding the defendant's
assertion that the psychiatric examination was conducted in violation
of his right against self-incrimination. Id. at 701-702. The Supreme
Court went on to state that in such circumstances, "the defendant's
use of psychiatric testimony might constitute a waiver of the Fifth
Amendment privilege, just as the privilege would be waived if the
defendant himself took the stand." Id. at 701-702, n.22. The Court of
Appeals explained that "any burden imposed on the defense by this
result is justified by the State's overwhelming difficulty in responding to the defense psychiatric testimony without its own psychiatric
examination of the accused and by the need to prevent fraudulent
mental defenses." Id. at 702.
The Supreme Court, however, was quick to point out that Battie
dealt exclusively with the Fifth Amendment privilege and that the
Fifth Circuit was not passing on a separate Sixth Amendment
challenge. 109 S.Ct. at 3149, citing, 655 F.2d, at 694, n. 2. The Court
observes that Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues must be discussed
separately since distinct analyses apply. Noting that while it may be
unfair to the State to deny the State a means of rebutting defendant's
psychiatric testimony, the Court concludes it certainly is not unfair to
require the State to provide counsel with notice prior to examination
on the issue of future dangerousness. Id. at 3149.
The distinction between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
analyses was recognized in Buchananv. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 107
S. Ct. 2906, 97 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1987). In Buchanan, the Court held
that a defendant waived his Fifth Amendment privilege by raising a
mental status defense, but in a separate section of the opinion the
Court addressed the Sixth Amendment issue, concluding counsel

